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JURY TRIALS IN BANKRUPTCY
COURT: ARE THERE ANY
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY OR
PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS?
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution commands that in suits at common law, the right to a trial by jury
must be preserved.' However, the authority of a bankruptcy court
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.
Id.
The Supreme Court has construed "Suits at common law" to mean that the seventh
amendment preserves an individual's right to a trial by jury in legal causes of action, as
distinguished from equitable or admiralty jurisdiction. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,
533 (1970) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830), overruled by
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)). The Court has recognized an
inherent difficulty in adequately distinguishing between legal and equitable actions. Ross,
396 U.S. at 533 (citing Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891)). "Characterization of an issue as legal or equitable is often a difficult federal law issue." 2 R. ROTUNDA, J.
NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.8,
at 257 n.12 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG]. Such characterization may often be achieved by analyzing the character of the issue to be adjudicated,
rather than the unique form of the complaint or the pleadings. Id. See also infra notes 1013 (discussing three-part test used by Court to decide whether seventh amendment preserves right to trial by jury).
The jury is an integral part of American jurisprudence, signifying our quest for the impartial resolution of litigants' disputes: "[A jury is a body of twelve persons,] described as
upright, well-qualified, and lawful [persons], disinterested and impartial, not of kin nor personal dependents of either of the parties, . . . sworn to render a true verdict according to
the law and the evidence given to them ....
" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1349 (5th ed.
1979). See generally R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra, § 17.8, at 256-59 n. 12-13 (3d
ed. 1986) (discussing seventh amendment right to jury trial in new causes of action); 9 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2301-02 (1971 & Supp. 1990)
(reviewing historical basis for, and principles applicable to, right to jury trial); Wolfram,
The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1973) (historical
foundations of seventh amendment rights); Rendleman, Chapters of the Civil Jury, 65 Ky.
L.J. 769, 769-72 (1976-77) (discussing role of jury in modern litigation and potential jury
prejudices).
The Supreme Court reiterated a three-part test to determine whether the seventh
amendment preserves a trial by jury to a defendant, where the plaintiff brought an action
pursuant to statute in the bankruptcy code. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782,
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to conduct a jury trial is not derived from the seventh amendment; rather, it is statutory in nature.' One frequently debated
constitutional issue regarding such statutes concerns the scope of
authority that may be permissibly granted to article I bankruptcy
courts.' While the absence of a constitutional grant of authority
2790 (1989). Granfinancierais relevant to the discussion herein, given the Court's finding
that a jury trial was guaranteed in petitioners' legal cause of action. Granfinanciera,109 S.
Ct. at 2802 ("the Seventh Amendment entitles petitioners to the jury trial they requested."). The three-part test employed by the GranfinancieraCourt entails: (1) the comparison of relevant legislation to 18th-century English actions tried before the law and equity courts merged; (2) the ascertainment of whether the action is legal or equitable in
nature; (3) the determination - provided that parts one and two indicate that a party has a
jury trial right under the seventh amendment - of whether Congress was empowered to
assign resolution of a claim to a non-article III adjudicative tribunal that does not utilize a
jury as factfinder. Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2790.
' See, e.g., Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d
1394, 1402 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269 (1990). After determining that the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction, and that the appellees had a right to a jury trial in their
cause of action, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated: "this brings us to the
issue of whether the bankruptcy court has statutory and constitutional authority to conduct
such trials." Id. at 1402. The Cooper court went on to find statutory authority based on a
combination of two statutes in Title 28 of the United States Code., "[d]espite the lack of a
specific statutory provision .... Id. See also Hughes-Bechtol, Inc. v. Air Enters., Inc. (In re
Hughes-Bechtol, Inc.), 107 Bankr. 552, 571 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989). In holding that
bankruptcy courts cannot conduct jury trials under the present code, the Hughes-Bechtol
court stated in dicta that the courts could, with consent of the parties, conduct trials by
jury if Congress enacted specific provisions authorizing them to do so. Id. at 573.
' See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)
(striking down Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 because it unconstitutionally granted article I bankruptcy court judges powers particular to article III tribunals); Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389, 397-408 (1973) (upholding constitutionality of District of Columbia
court structure, which bestowed jurisdiction in certain criminal cases upon article I courts);
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381-83 (1977) (collateral relief available in Superior Court
is neither ineffective nor inadequate simply because judges of that court lack protection of
article III judges).
Jurisdiction is "the legal right by which judges exercise their authority." BLACK's LAW
DICTMONARY 766 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Max Ams, Inc. v. Barker, 293 Ky. 678, 701, 170
S.W.2d 45, 48 (1943)). See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, (1877) (detailing traditional
bases for personal jurisdiction); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (delineating "minimum contacts" standard for personal jurisdiction). "The exercise of jurisdiction can ...be
substantively controlled by [Congress'] channeling [of] certain issues through non-article
III tribunals." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-5, at 51 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE]. Congress' power to channel issues through non-article III courts (by creating
non-article III courts) is derived from article 1, section 8 of the United States Constitution.
Id. This provision suggests that Congress shall have the power "To constitute Tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court". U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.9. However, "[t]he Supreme
Court has never definitively resolved how far Congress, . . . may [go to] create tribunals to
resolve questions falling within the subject-matter jurisdiction of article III courts unencumbered by the tenure limitations and justiciability requirements of article III." TRIBE,
supra, at 51. The issue, most often, is whether certain grants of jurisdiction by Congress
upon non-article III tribunals are unconstitutional because certain disputes may only be
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cannot deprive litigants of their seventh amendment right to a
jury trial, it may nevertheless prevent them from exercising this
right in a bankruptcy court.4 Recently, in Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg,6 a divided United States Supreme Court held that an
individual who has not submitted a claim 6 against a bankrupt estate is guaranteed a trial by jury when defending a fraudulent
conveyance action.' The specific issue of whether bankruptcy
courts are empowered to conduct such jury trials was not, however, conclusively determined by the Court.'
This Note will first address the Granfinancieradecision, focusing
on the Supreme Court's refusal to decide whether bankruptcy
courts are empowered to conduct jury trials. The authors will
adjudicated by article III tribunals. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60; Palmore, 411 U.S.
at 390-400; TRIBE, supra, at § 3-5.
See Wilkey v. Inter-Trade, Inc. (In re Owensboro Distilling Co.), 108 Bankr. 572, 576
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1989). The court stated that:
[The] presence of a Constitutional right to jury trial does not then equate the ability
of the bankruptcy court to conduct that trial - it simply means that the bankruptcy
court will need to determine if such a right exists. The litigants would then resort to
another appropriate court - either state court or federal - for the jury trial.
Id.
Citing an absence of authority, bankruptcy courts have often evinced an aversion to conducting jury trials. See, e.g., Friedman v. Gold Advice, Inc. (In re Fort Lauderdale Hotel
Partners, Ltd.), 103 Bankr. 335, 337 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (granting defendant's motion
for jury trial but abstaining from hearing matter and remanding to state court, reasoning
that bankruptcy court did not have authority to conduct such trials); Weeks v. Kramer (In
re Weeks Sec., Inc.), 89 Bankr. 697, 715 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988) ("This Court has concluded that there is no statutory procedural authority for the Bankruptcy Court to conduct
jury trials."); Braun v. Zarling (In re Zarling), 85 Bankr. 802, 804 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988)
(transference of proceeding to state court eliminated necessity of determining jury trial
issue).
The Wilkey court emphasized that a litigant with a constitutional right to trial by jury,
guaranteed under the seventh amendment, retains that right regardless of whether the
bankruptcy court has statutory authority to conduct the jury trial. Wilkey, 108 Bankr. at
576 (citing Taubman W. Assoc. v. Beugen (In re Beugen), 81 Bankr. 994, 997 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1988)).
5 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989).
' See II U.S.C. § 501 (1988). This section allows creditors to share in the debtor's estate
by filing a written proof of claim with the bankruptcy court. Id. See generally B. WEINTRAUB
& A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 1 5.04 at 5-6 (1986) [hereinafter WEINTRAUB]
(proof of claim discussion); COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 12.5 at 499 (1989)
[hereinafter COWANS] (same).
' Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2799. Since the action here did not rely on the statutory
process or the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations the Court concluded that "Congress . . . cannot divest petitioners of their Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury."
Id.
, Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2802.
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then analyze the present Bankruptcy Code as it applies to bankruptcy courts and conclude that these courts are not expressly authorized by statute to conduct jury trials. Furthermore, the constitutionality of such a grant of authority under article III of the
Constitution will be addressed. This Note will then propose that
Congress grant bankruptcy courts the express authority to conduct jury trials in the interest of efficiency or, in the alternative,
make bankruptcy courts article III tribunals. Finally, acknowledging the ramifications of granting bankruptcy courts authority to
conduct jury trials, it will be suggested that bankruptcy judges be
given discretion in deciding whether their courts can equitably
and efficiently conduct a jury trial, or whether withdrawal to the
district court is more appropriate or necessary under the
circumstances.
I.

GRANFINANCIERA,

S.A. v.

NORDBERG

In Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberg, the Supreme Court held that
an individual has a right to a jury trial when defending a fraudulent conveyance action initiated by the trustee in a bankruptcy
proceeding. 9 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, utilized a
three part analysis to determine whether the petitioner had a sevIId. In Granfinanciera,the Chase and Sanborn Corporation filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11. Id. at 2787. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida approved a reorganization plan which vested in Nordberg, the trustee of the bankrupt estate, causes of action for fraudulent conveyances. Id. Respondent
filed suit in federal district court against Granfinanciera and Medex for allegedly receiving
fraudulent transfers of $1.7 million from Chase and Sanborn's corporate predecessor
within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy petition without receiving sufficient consideration. Id.
The District Court referred the fraudulent conveyance action to the bankruptcy court,
which subsequently denied petitioners' request for a jury trial, deeming the action equitable in nature. Id. The Bankruptcy court entered judgment for Nordberg, the trustee, on
the constructive fraud claim, which judgment was affirmed by the district court. Id. at
2802. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision, declaring that
Granfinanciera and Medex had no statutory right to a jury trial, and that no seventh
amendment right to a jury trial existed under these facts. See Nordberg v. Granfinanciera,
S.A. (In re Chase and Sanborn Corp.), 835 F, 2d 1341, 1348-50 (11th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109
S. Ct. 2782, 2787-88 (1989). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of petitioners' right to ajury trial. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988). The
Supreme Court subsequently reversed the circuit court's decision and held that
Granfinanciera and Medex had a seventh amendment right to a jury trial. Granfinanciera,
109 S. Ct. at 2782, 2787.
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enth amendment right to a trial by jury." First, the Court compared petitioner's statutory action to eighteenth century actions
brought in England before the merger of the law and equity
courts." Second, the Court determined whether the remedy
which petitioners sought was legal or equitable.1 2 Finally, once
these two factors indicated that petitioners had a seventh amendment right to a trial by jury, the Court examined the issue of
whether Congress had assigned resolution of the claim to a nonarticle III adjudicative body that did not use juries as factfinders.' 3
10Granfinanciera,109 S. Ct. at 2790. This analysis was employed by the Court in Tull v.
United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-25 (1987).
11 Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2790. Part one of the test was also employed by the
Court in Tull. Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-21. The Tull Court noted that "characterizing the
relief sought is '[m]ore important' than finding a precisely analogous common-law cause of
action in determining whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial." Tull, 481
U.S. at 421 (citing Curtis v.Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)). Pursuant to part one of
the test, the Granfinanciera Court cited an array of cases brought in England in the late
1700's in the examination of petitioner's assertion that the present actions for monetary
relief would not have sounded in equity two hundred years ago in England. See
Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2791. Part one of the test, however, is of less import in the
overall inquiry. For example, the Tull Court acknowledged that this part of the test "has
been called an 'abstruse historical' search for the nearest 18th-century analog." Tull, 481
U.S. at 421 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970)). The Granfinanciera
Court also recognized that part one of the test is less significant than part two. See
Granfinanciera, 109 S.Ct. at 2790.
"sGranfinanciera, 109 S.Ct. at 2793-94. In reviewing the second part of the test proposed by the Court, whether a case is one lying in equity or at law, it was emphasized that
"[ilf the right is legal in nature, then it carries with it the Seventh Amendment's guarantee
of a jury trial." Id. at 2797. Pursuant to this second prong, Granfinanciera stressed the
doctrine that "suits in equity will not be sustained where a complete remedy exists at law."
Id. at 2793. See also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 45859 & n.14 (1977) ("as a general rule, the decision turn[s] on whether courts of law suppl[y]
a cause of action and an adequate remedy to the litigant.") (citing The Judiciary Act of
1789, 1 Stat. 82, which provided: "Sec. 16. And be it
further enacted, That suits in equity
shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain
adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.") (emphasis in original).
In addition, the Court maintained that the seventh amendment also applies to actions
where the plaintiff seeks to invoke "statutory rights [which] are analogous to common law
causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts in the late eighteenth century, as
opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity or admiralty." Granfinanciera,109
S. Ct. at 2790 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974)). In Curtis, the Court
stated, "we have often found the Seventh Amendment applicable to causes of action based
on statutes." Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193 (citing Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477
(1962) (trademark laws); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (1909) (immigration
laws)).
" Granfinanciera, 109 S.Ct. at 2797-2802. This stem of the analysis was first emphasized
in Atlas Roofing, wherein the Court dictated, "[Wlhen Congress creates new statutory 'public rights', it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury
would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury
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After a historical analysis of fraudulent conveyance claims,"
and upon a determination that monetary relief was sought,1 5 the
Court concluded that petitioners had a legal claim rather than an
equitable one.' Consequently, petitioners were deemed to have
been guaranteed a trial by jury, provided that Congress had not
permissibly granted bankruptcy courts, sitting without juries, the
right to try such actions."7 Relying on Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupatrial is to be 'preserved' in 'suits at common law.'" Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 455. For a
discussion of the "public rights" doctrine, see infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
" Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2791. The Court first noted that "[tlhere [was] no dispute that actions to recover preferential or fraudulent transfers were often brought at law
in late 18th-century England." Id. at 2790-91. The Court focused on the cases brought in
England and compared the present case to "common law actions of trover and money had
and received",. which were traditionally brought before juries. Id. at 2791 (quoting
Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co. 287 U.S. 92, 94 (1932)). The Court cited many cases to
support this view, including: Smith v. Payne, 101 Eng. Rep. 484 (1795) (trover); Barnes v.
Freeland, 101 Eng. Rep. 447 (1794) (trover); Vernon v. Hanson, 101 Eng. Rep. 156 (1788)
(assumpsit; money had and received). Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2791. The Court dismissed the respondent's claim that three recent courts of appeals' cases supported respondent's view that fraudulent money transfers were traditionally recognized as equity claims.
Id. at 2792 n.5. The Court concluded that, in 18th-century England, respondent would
have had to have brought his action to recover for a fraudulent transfer of money at law,
and not in equity. Id. at 2792-93:
1" Granfinanciera,109 S. Ct. at 2793-94. The Court noted that "[tihe nature of the relief
respondent seeks strongly supports our preliminary finding that the right he invokes
should be denominated legal rather than equitable." Id. at 2793. The Court cited previous
Supreme Court decisions that set forth the proposition that a bill in equity would not be
sustained if the damages sought could be recovered adequately at law. Id. (citing, e.g.,
Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 370 (1974) ("[W]here an action is simply for the
recovery ... of a money judgment, the action is one at law.") (quoting Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891)). The Granfinanciera Court then compared the respondents' claim to its decision in Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., wherein the Court "removed all
doubt that respondent's cause of action should be characterized as legal rather than as
equitable." Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2793. The GranfinancieraCourt pointed out that
the recipients of the alleged preferential transfers in Schoenthal apparently had not filed
any claims against the bankrupt estate. Id. See also Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S.
92 (1932). In Schoenthal, the respondent brought a suit in equity seeking to void alleged
preferential transfers to defendants. Id. at 93. The defendants moved for a transfer to a
court at law and for a trial by jury. Id. at 93-94. The defendants' motion was denied, the
case was tried in equity, and a decision was rendered in favor of the respondent. Id. at 94.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Id. In reversing, the Supreme Court
stated that the alleged facts gave "no support to the plaintiff's assertion that it ha[d] no
adequate remedy at law. The preferences sued for were money payments of ascertained
and definite amounts." Id. at 95. As a result, the Court determined that the defendants
were entitled to have the suit tried at law instead of in equity. Id. at 96.
16 Granfinanciera,109 S. Ct. at 2793-94.
" Id. at 2794. The Court stated "unless Congress may and has permissibly withdrawn
jurisdiction over that action by courts of law and assigned it exclusively to non-Article III
tribunals sitting without juries, the Seventh Amendment guarantees petitioners a jury trial
upon request." Id. The Court cited section 157(b)(2)(H) [1982 ed., Supp. IV] of Title 28 of
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tional Safety and Health Review Commission, 8 where it was held that
Congress may only deny jury trials in actions at law in cases where
public rights are litigated, 19 the Court defined the essential limits
of "public rights", 0 and reasoned that fraudulent conveyance actions are matters of private rights rather than public rights." As
such, the Court concluded that a fraudulent conveyance action
against a transferee who has not filed a claim against the bankrupt
estate is a legal claim, to which the seventh amendment's jury trial
guarantee attaches.2 2
In dissent, Justice White asserted that the majority's decision
the United States Code, which designated fraudulent conveyance actions as "core proceedings;" therefore, bankruptcy judges may adjudicate if a district court has referred the matter to them. Id. However, the Court declined to address the issues of: (1) whether bankruptcy courts could conduct jury trials in fraudulent conveyance actions brought against a
party who had not entered a claim against a bankrupt estate; (2) whether bankruptcy courts
were authorized to hold jury trials in such actions; and (3) whether, if jury trials can be
held in bankruptcy court, the seventh amendment's assurance that no fact tried by a jury
shall be reviewed would be violated by the present procedure allowing for de novo review of
a bankruptcy courts ruling by the district court. Id. at 2794-95.
18 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
'9 Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2795 (citing Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 458). The Court in
Atlas Roofing emphasized that "[o]n the common law side of the federal courts, the aid of
juries is not only deemed appropriate but is required by the Constitution." Atlas Roofing,
430 U.S. at 450, n.7. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
The Atlas Roofing Court further considered whether Congress could create new actions
and assign their enforceability to an administrative agency, where no jury trial could be
held. Id. at 444. The Court held that "when Congress create[d] new statutory 'public
rights,' it [could] assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury
trial would be incompatible, without violating the seventh amendment's injunction that
jury trial[s] [were] to be 'preserved' in 'suits at common law.'" Id. at 455. However, the
Granfinanciera Court pointed out that Congress could not divest a party of his right to a
jury trial in contesting matters of "private rights." Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2795.
"o Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2795. The Granfinanciera Court stated, "Our prior cases
support administrative factfinding in only those situations involving 'public rights,' e.g.,
where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute
creating enforceable public rights." Id. (quoting Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 458). The Supreme Court further clarified the meaning of "public rights" in Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985). The Thomas Court held that the federal
government need not be a party for a case to involve "public rights." Id. The
GranfinancieraCourt stipulated that if a statutory right was not closely related to a federal
regulatory program that Congress has the power to enact, and the federal government is
not concerned with such a right, then the right must be adjudicated by an article III court.
Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2797.
21 Granfinanciera,109 S. Ct. at 2797. The Court noted that in certain situations, "Congress may fashion causes of action that are closely analogous to common law claims and
place them beyond the ambit of the seventh amendment ...
." Id. at 2796. The Court
cautioned, however, that this power is very limited and not applicable to the case at bar. Id.
As such, the Court found this fraudulent conveyance action to be private. Id. at 2799.
22

Id.
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can be read as overruling several Supreme Court decisions and
striking down at least one federal statute. 8 He argued that, with
the historical evidence in equipoise and the nature of relief not
dispositive, the Court should defer to Congress' exercise of its
power under article I, section 8, clause 4 of the United States
Constitution."'
Although the question of whether bankruptcy courts have the
power to conduct jury trials is not novel,2 5 it is suggested that the
Granfinanciera Court created more problems than it solved by
holding that at least one "core proceeding" 2 - a fraudulent con2S Granfinanciera,109 S. Ct. at 2805-06 (White, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice White
noted that the GranfinancieraCourt's holding calls into question Katchen v. Landy, 382
U.S. 323 (1966), which concluded, "[w]hen Congress does commit the issue and recovery
of a preference to adjudication in a bankruptcy proceeding, the seventh amendment is
inapplicable," Id. at 33 (quoted in Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2807 (White, J,, dissenting)). In Katchen, the petitioners argued that the question of whether preference payments
had been made was one for a jury. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336. Their argument, however,
was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. Id.
In Granfinanciera,Justice White maintained that the long standing assumption by the
bankruptcy courts and the Supreme Court cases was that "the equitable proceedings of
[the bankruptcy courts,] adjudicating creditor-debtor disputes, are adjudications concerning public rights." Granfinanciera,109 S. Ct. at 2815 (citations omitted). The adjudication
of actions at law where public rights are litigated may be assigned by Congress "to an
administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the
Seventh Amendment ...." Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 458. Justice White reasoned that
since "no part of bankruptcy proceedings involve the adjudication of public rights, as the
Court implies," then bankruptcy proceedings, necessarily adjudications of private rights,
must always carry a jury trial guarantee unless the particular cause of action is "the decedent[] of earlier analogues heard in equity in 18th-century England." Granfinanciera, 109
S. Ct. at 2815-16 (White, J., dissenting). "Because, as almost every historian has observed,
this period was marked by a far more restrictive notion of equitable jurisdiction in bankruptcies, the Court's decision today may threaten the efficacy of bankruptcy courts as they
are now constituted." Id. at 2816 (White, J., dissenting).
" Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2814 (White, J., dissenting). "[W]ith the historical evidence thus in equipoise - and the nature of relief sought here not dispositive either... we
should not hesitate to defer to Congress' exercise of its power under the Constitution,
specifically Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 ...." Id. (White, J., dissenting). The dissent also
argued that the majority's decision could threaten the utility of the bankruptcy courts and
undermine the purpose for which they were created. Id. at 2816. (White, J., dissenting).
1' See Wilkey v. Inter-Trade, Inc. (In re Owensboro Distilling Co.), 108 Bankr. 572, 575
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1989) ("Like Freddy Krueger or Jason, the issue of whether a Bankruptcy Judge can conduct a jury trial refuses to die.").
" See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1988). This section provides a non-exhaustive list of "core
proceedings" which are matters that "[b]ankruptcy judges may hear and determine." Id. at
§ 157 (b)(1). This list includes such matters as "proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover
fraudulent preferences," id. at § 157 (b)(2)(F), "to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent
conveyances," id. at § 157 (b)(2)(H), and the "determination of the validity, extent, or
priority of liens" id. at § 157 (b)(2)(K). See generally WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, 6.04[2] at
6-15 to 6-20 (core proceedings discussion); CowANs, supra note 6, § 1.2 at 31-46 (same).
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veyance action against a transferee who has not filed a claim
against the bankrupt estate - is a legal claim requiring a jury
trial2 7 without delineating the tribunal in which such trial should
take place. It is further submitted that jury trial demands made
pursuant to the Granfinancieraholding will lead to inconsistent decision-making by bankruptcy, district and appellate courts as a result of the Court's failure to prescribe the appropriate tribunal.
Although the GranfinancieraCourt expressly decided not to answer this difficult question,2 8 Justice Brennan suggested that the
issue requires consideration of three factors: (1) whether Congress
has expressly authorized article I bankruptcy courts to conduct
jury trials, (2) whether this grant of power would comport with
article III, and finally, (3) whether the seventh amendment's standard of review for jury trials would be violated by this grant of
power. 9
II.

STATUTORY ANALYSIS

Since Congress has not expressly authorized bankruptcy courts
to conduct jury trials,3 0 most bankruptcy judges, when faced with
'7 Granfinanciera,109 S. Ct. at 2792-93 ("We therefore conclude that respondent would
have had to bring his action to recover an alleged fraudulent conveyance of a determinate
sum of money at law in 18th-century England, and that a court of equity would not have
adjudicated it.").
's See Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2802. The Court stated:
We do not decide today whether the current jury trial provision -28 U.S.C. § 1411
• . - permits bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials in fraudulent conveyance actions like the one respondent initiated. Nor do we express any view as to whether
the Seventh Amendment or Article III allows jury trials in such actions to be held
before non-Article III bankruptcy judges subject to the oversight provided by the
We leave those issues for future decisions.
district courts ....
Id.
, See id. at 2796-2800.
See Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394
(2d Cir.), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269 (1990). In Cooper, the Second Circuit stated,
"[d]espite the lack of a speific statutory provision, we nevertheless hold that the bankruptcy
courts may conduct jury trials in core proceedings." Id. at 1402 (emphasis added). See also
Hughes-Bechtol v. Air Enter., Inc. (In re Hughes-Bechtol), 107 Bankr. 552, 571 (S.D. Ohio
1989) ("Congress has clearly not enacted any legislation specifically authorizing bankruptcy
court[s] to conduct jury trials"); I.A. Durbin v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank (In re Durbin), 62
Bankr. 135, 146 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (discussing limited right to jury trials - i.e., available only
in district courts - under present code).
But see Haden v. Edwards (In re Edwards), 104 Bankr. 890, 893-900 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1989). The bankruptcy court in Edwards used the lack of express authority in the bankruptcy code as support for finding itself incompetent to conduct a jury trial. Id. at 897
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motions demanding trial by jury, look to the Bankruptcy Code for
guidance. 1 Courts have differed as to whether the Code contains
the implicit authority to conduct jury trials. 2
(citing Weeks v. Kramer (In re G. Weeks Sec.), 89 Bankr. 697 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988)).
The court noted that United States Magistrates conduct jury trials pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 636(c)(1), but recognized that such is not applicable to bankruptcy courts, nor does
"comparable language exist[ ] in 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 or elsewhere." Id. at 897-98. Compare
28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c)(1) (West Supp. 1989) (granting U.S. Magistrates right to hold certain
jury trials) with 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West Supp. 1985) (bankruptcy courts not expressly
granted right to hold jury trials). The Edwards court reasoned:
Arguably, Congress could have clearly specified that the bankruptcy courts are not
authorized to conduct jury trials. It is a more compelling argument... that Congress
could easily have expressed its intention that the bankruptcy courts were authorized
to conduct such trials. The absence of that positive expression and the presence of
statutory language to the contrary, coupled with Marathon limits placed on this
Court's authority makes it clear ... that Congress did not authorize jury trials in the
bankruptcy courts.
Edwards, 104 Bankr. at 898 (quoting Weeks, 89 Bankr. at 714 (emphasis in original)). See
generally COWANS, supra note 6, § 1.6 at 77 (1989) ("There is no statute about jury trial any
longer other than the provision of section 141 l(b) [which provides that the court may order that the issues in an involuntary petition be tried without a jury]"); COwANS, supra §
1.6 at 78 ("Yet nothing in Section 303, or elsewhere in Title 11, grants any statutory right
to a jury trial."); Sabino, Jury Trials in the Bankruptcy Court: The Controversy Ends, 93 COM.
L.J. 238 (1987) [hereinafter Sabino] (arguing that present bankruptcy code contains no
authority for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials); King, Jurisdiction and Procedure
Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 704 (1985) [hereinafter
King] ("Moreover, there is no authorization in Title 11 or Title 28 for bankruptcy judges
to conduct jury trials.").
81 See, e.g., Data Compass Corp. v. Datafast, Inc. (In re Data Compass Corp.), 92 Bankr.
575, 582 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("We further believe that the authority to conduct a jury
trial is implicit in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) with respect to core proceedings."); Hughes-Bechtol,
107 Bankr. at 569 ("[T]his court begins its examination of the presently existing authority
for a bankruptcy court to conduct a jury trial."); Edwards, 104 Bankr. at 893-900 (detailed
analysis of authority to conduct jury trial); Weeks, 89 Bankr. at 708-16 (same). See also Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the Commands of Article III and the Seventh Amendment,
72 Mx N. L. REV. 967 (1988) [hereinafter Gibson]. Professor Gibson noted that the majority of bankruptcy courts have found the implied authority to conduct jury trials in the
present Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1029. Gibson further noted that "these courts infer such
authority from a variety of sources: section 1411; Bankruptcy Rule 9015, which prior to its
abrogation prescribed the procedure for jury trials; or. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), which authorize[d] district courts to refer bankruptcy matters to bankruptcy judges." Id. at 1029-30
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). These statutes are discussed further, infra, notes 3536 and accompanying text (discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 141 1(a)); notes 65-73 and accompanying text (discussion of former Bankruptcy Rule 9015).
Lastly, former bankruptcy Judge Cowans stated that "a strong inference arises from Section 1411 (b) that there is some right to a jury trial. It may be considered an implied statutory right." COWANS, supra note 6, § 1.6 at 78 (emphasis added).
" Compare Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 896 F.2d 1394, 1404 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269 (1990) (no statutory or constitutional bar to holding jury trials in
present case); Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v. United Bank of Kan. City (In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co.),
108 Bankr. 710, 714 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) ("It is clear from the language of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 151 and 157(b) that Congress has enacted a statutory grant of authority which is suffi-

298

Jury Trials
A.

Present Statutory Authority

With respect to jury trials in the bankruptcy court, the present
statutory scheme contains only 28 U.S.C. § 1411, entitled "Jury
Trials."8 3 No other provision expressly pertains to jury trials in
the bankruptcy court.'
Section 1411(a) provides that chapter 87 (28 U.S.C. §§ 14081412, which furnish the venue for the district courts), and title 11
(the Bankruptcy Code), "do not affect any right to trial by jury
that an individual has under applicable non-bankruptcy law with
regard to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim." 5 Seccient for bankruptcy judges, as units of the district court, to conduct jury trials in the core
proceedings."); Perino v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 107 Bankr. 453, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(allowing jury trial in bankruptcy court in antidiscrimination tort claim); and Data Compass,
92 Bankr. at 582 (core proceedings' statute provides implicit authority to conduct jury
trials) with Wilkey v. Inter-Trade, Inc. (In re Owensboro Distilling Co.), 108 Bankr. 572,
576 (W.D. Ky. 1989) ("jury trials are statutorily authorized only in personal injury or
wrongful death claims and possibly [with respect to issues arising from an involuntary petition]") (emphasis added); Hughes-Bechtol, 107 Bankr. at 571 (no specific statutory authority
in code empowers bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials); Edwards, 104 Bankr. at 899
(there are "constitutional, statutory, and procedural impediments to a jury trial in the
bankruptcy court"); Friedman v. Gold Advice, Inc. (In re Fort Lauderdale Partners, Ltd.),
103 Bankr. 335, 336 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) ("no statutory authority granted in the Bankruptcy Code to empower the Bankruptcy Court to conduct jury trials .... [Therefore]
these trials should be conducted in district or state court.") (citing Durbin, 62 Bankr. at 139
); and Weeks, 89 Bankr. at 715 ("This Court is persuaded that Congress must provide a
statutory procedure, similar to that for magistrates, to instill jury authority in the bankruptcy courts.").
" Sie, e.g., Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2789 n.3 (1989) ("The current statutory provision for jury trials in bankruptcy proceedings [is] 28 U.S.C. § 1411 ...
."); Durbin, 62 Bankr. at 146 (authority to conduct jury trials in bankruptcy court only
addressed in section 141 l(a)). See also CowANs, supra note 6, § 1.6, at 70. "No provision of
Title 11 or Title 28 expressly states that a jury trial is or is not available in bankruptcy
matters." Id. "There is no statute about jury trial any longer other than the provision of
Section 1411 (b) .... IId. at 77. See also supra note 4 (citing relevant caselaw concerning
judicial determinations on existence of authority permitting bankruptcy courts to grant
jury trials).
" See supra note 4 and accompanying text (caselaw construing authority to conduct jury
trials in bankruptcy courts).
8 28 U.S.C § 1411 (Supp. 1987). This section, entitled "Jury trials," provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter and title 11 do
not affect any right to trial by jury that an individual has under applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim.
(b) The district court may order the issues arising under section 303 of title 11 to be
tried without a jury.
Id.
The Official Comment to section 1411(a) informs:
Subsection (a) is a limitation of what was formerly contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1480.
The former provision, added in 1978, retained the right to jury trial as it existed
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tion 1411 (a) is clarified somewhat by an Advisory Committee Note
in the 1987 Amendments.3 This Note apprises: "Section 1411
added by the 1984 amendments affords a jury trial only for personal injury or wrongful death claims, which 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5)
requires be tried in the district court.137 Thus, section 1411 (a) acknowledges that chapter 87 and title 11 have removed jury rights
from bankruptcy courts, its purpose being to insure that litigants
would not lose their seventh amendment jury right in personal
injury and wrongful death tort claims.3 8 Some courts have read
under any statute in effect on September 30, 1979; accordingly, the type of cause of
action was not a material consideration. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1411, however, the
only right to a jury trial that is retained is that of
(i) an individual;
(ii) existing under applicable nonbankruptcy law;
(iii) concerning a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim....
Id.
" Bankr. R. 9015 [abrogated] (Advisory Committee Note reprinted in COLLIER, BANKRuPTcY RULES 1990). The Advisory Committee Note to the 1987 Amendments, which abrogated Bankruptcy Rule 9015, provides:
Former section 1480 of title 28 preserved a right to trial by jury in any case or
proceeding under title 11 in which jury trial was provided by statute. Rule 9015
provided the procedure for jury trials in bankruptcy courts. Section 1480 was repealed. Section 1411 added by the 1984 amendments affords a jury trial only for
personal injury or wrongful death claims, which 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) requires be
tried in the district court. Nevertheless, Rule 9015 has been cited as conferring a
right to jury trial in other matters before bankruptcy judges. In light of the clear
mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 2075 that the "rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify
any substantive right," Rule 9015 is abrogated. In the event the courts of appeals or
the Supreme Court define a right to a jury trial in any bankruptcy matters, a local
rule in substantially the form of Rule 9015 can be adopted pending amendment of
these rules.
Id.
'7 Id.

" See, e.g., Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2789 n.3 (1989). The Court
stated that section 141 l(a) "might suggest that jury trials are available only in personal
injury and wrongful death actions, [but] that conclusion is debatable." Id. While the Court
stated that the submitted interpretation is "debatable," it provided little support for this
assertion. Id. The Court further suggested that section 1411(b) provides authority for the
district court to order that the issues in an involuntary petition be tried by the judge alone.
See id. It interpreted this as "suggesting that the court lacks similar discretion to deny jury
trials on at least some issues presented in connection with voluntary petitions." Id. But the
United States Supreme Court neither offers sufficient guidance on this possible interpretation of section 1411, nor does it substantiate the claim. Id. The Court does support its
assertion that the legislative history on the section has confused commentators, but merely
by naming two law review articles that express dismay on the legislative history. See id.
(citing Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the Commands of Article III and the Seventh
Amendment, 72 MINN. L. REV. 967, 989-996 (1988); Note, The Bankruptcy Amendments and
FederalJudgeship Act of 1984: The Impact on the Right of Jury by Trial in Bankruptcy Court, 16
TEX. TECH. L REV. 535, 543-46 (1985)). The Court discusses its alternative interpretation
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section 1411(a) as conferring the negative implication that the
Bankruptcy Code removed the power of the bankruptcy courts to
conduct jury trials, and that therefore, with respect to the torts
named in the section, litigants must obtain trial by jury in the district courts.3 9 Other courts have read this section as requiring
only that the named tort actions be tried in the district court, but
as otherwise not affecting the4 0 bankruptcy courts' power to try
other causes of action by jury.
Notwithstanding the two conflicting interpretations, it is suggested that section 1411(a) does not confer express statutory authority upon the bankruptcy courts to employ juries as their
factfinders, given its apparent acknowledgement that title 11 does
no further. See id. See also T. CRANDALL, R. HAGEDORN, F. SMITH JR., DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW
MANUAL
11.05 at 11-51, 11-52 (1985).
The apparent intent of subsection (a) of Section 1411 is to preserve for personal
injury tort or wrongful death claims any right of trial by jury that might exist under
non-bankruptcy law... [A]rguably such claims must be determined by the district
court... it is not clear that the bankruptcy judge may conduct jury trials.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
89 See, e.g., Huffman v. Perkinson (In re Harbour), 840 F.2d 1165, 1165 (4th Cir. 1988).
The Huffman decision asserts that section 141 l(a) simply limits litigants' jury rights to
wrongful death and personal injury tort claims, and that there is no other statutory right to
jury trials. Id. at 1179. In Berryman v. Smith (In re Smith), 84 Bankr. 175 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1988), Judge Mooreman stated: "[The view] adopted by this court, is that § 1411 is declaratory of the right to ajury trial on a 'limited class of contingent tort claims.' " Id. at 177-78
(citing In re Kaufman, P.A., 78 Bankr. 309, 311 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987) (quoting Morse
Elec. Co. v. Logicon, Inc. (In re Morse Elec. Co.), 47 Bankr. 234, 238 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1985)). judge Mooreman also quoted the Advisory Committee Note to abrogated Bankruptcy Rule 9015, which appears in the 1987 amendments. See 114 F.R.D. 392 (1987). He
wrote, "§ 1480 [was] repealed ... Section 1411 [(added by the 1984 amendments)] affords
a jury only for personal injury or wrongful death claims, which 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) requires to be tried in the district court." Smith, 84 Bankr. at 177-78. Judge Mooreman then
concluded from the language in section 141 1(a), which states that the section does not
affect any jury trial rights except with respect to the torts named therein, that "presumably
it does affect (and eliminate by exclusion) such rights regarding other claims." Id. at 178
(quoting Jacobs v. O'Bannon (In re O'Bannon), 49 Bankr. 763, 769 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985)
(emphasis added by quoting court)). He held, therefore, that the bankruptcy court had no
authority to grant a jury trial in the plaintiff's causes of action, since they were neither for
personal injury nor for wrongful death. Id. See also supra note 12 (discussing concept of
public rights).
40 See, e.g., Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 896 F.2d 1394, 1402 (2d Cir.), cert
granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269 (1990). In Cooper, the Second Circuit held that the bankruptcy
courts are inferentially empowered to conduct jury trials by two statutes in title 28 of the
United States Code. Id. at 1402-03. Thus, Cooper, controlling authority for all Second Circuit bankruptcy courts, holds that jury trials may authoritatively be conducted, "[d]espite
the lack of a specific statutory provision," and, ostensibly, despite section 1411. Id. at 1402.
See also infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (discussion of Cooper opinion).
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not provide bankruptcy courts with authority to conduct jury trials."1 As previously set forth, the section provides that title 11
"does not affect any right to a trial by jury" with respect to the
named tort causes of action. 2 It would be unnecessary to preserve
a jury trial in these causes of action if the Bankruptcy Code so
provided.43 Indeed, one commentator has suggested that section
1411 (a) would be redundant if the right to a jury trial still existed
under other causes of action,"' which is logical since the Bankruptcy Code itself provides no authority to conduct jury trials. As
such, section 1411(a) requires certain tort causes of action that
must be tried by jury, be so tried in the district court, addressing
the Code's failure to furnish bankruptcy courts with the authority
to conduct the jury trial.
B.

Prior Statutory Authority

The original Bankruptcy Act of 1898 authorized bankruptcy
courts to conduct jury trials only when an involuntary bankruptcy
petition was filed which involved issues of insolvency and the commission of an "Act of Bankruptcy."' 5 Under this Act, bankruptcy
41 See supra note 35 (full text of section 1411); supra note 36 (text of Advisory Committee Note which states that section 1411 provides for jury trials only in two tort causes of
action, which trials are unambiguously relegated to district courts); supra notes 38-40 (array of courts' views on section 1411).
4- 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (Supp. V 1987). See supra note 35 (full text of section 1411).
Professor Gibson states: "By preserving jury
48 See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 31, at 991.
trial rights for this limited class of cases, Congress may have meant that all other bankruptcy matters should be tried without a jury." Id. (footnote omitted). But Gibson further
notes that subsection (b) of 1411 would be unnecessary if that were the correct interpretation. Id. Section 141 1(b) allows the district court to order that the issues in an involuntary
petition be tried without a jury. 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (b) (Supp. V 1987). The author's submission in this Note is simply that Congress intended 1411 (a) to provide for jury trials in the
specific causes of action named, and purported to authorize district court judges to order
that the issues arising from an involuntary petition be tried without a jury, while affording
these judges the ability to conduct the jury trial if they do not so order (pursuant to section
1411(b)). See Gibson, supra note 31, at 991 & n.105 ("[S]ection 1411(a) would be totally
redundant if the right to jury trial continued to exist in other types of disputes.") (quoting
King, Jurisdictionand Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV.
675, 706-07 (1985)).
" See King, supra note 30, at 706-07.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 19(a), 30 Stat. 551. Section 19(a) provided:
Sec. 19. JURY TRIALS.-(a) A person against whom an involuntary petition has
been filed shall be entitled to have a trial by jury, in respect to the question of his
insolvency, except as herein otherwise provided, and any act of bankruptcy alleged
in such petition to have been committed, upon filing a written application therefor
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courts were limited to exercising "summary jurisdiction,"4
wherein the judge could only adjudicate matters over which the
bankrupt estate had possession, or matters consented to by the
non-bankrupt party. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,'7 however, expanded the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts and
amended Title 28 of the United States Code by adding section
1480.48 Under section 1480(b), bankruptcy courts were authorized to adjudicate issues arising from an involuntary petition without a jury.49 Similar to section 1411(a) of the present bankruptcy
code,6" former section 1480(a) provided that bankruptcy jurisdiction would not affect any right to a trial by jury, but unlike section
1411 (a), only if "provided by any statute in effect on September
30, 1979. " '1 This provision was construed by some bankruptcy

courts as authorizing them to conduct jury trials.6 2 Other bankat or before the tim [sic] within which an answer may be filed. If such application is
not file [sic] within such time, a trial by jury shall be deemed to have been waived.
Id. An act of bankruptcy was defined under the Act of 1898 as (1) an act that "hinder[s],
delay[s], or defraud[s] his creditors;" (2) a transfer of assets by the insolvent, while solvent,
to creditors "with intent to prefer such creditors over his other creditors;" (3) permitting a
creditor to obtain a preference, while insolvent, through legal proceedings; (4) the making
of "a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors; or (5) admitt[ing] in writing his
inability to pay his debts and his willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt on that ground."
Id. at § 3, 30 Stat., at 546.
" See CowAis, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 14 n.17 ("Under the poorly named concepts of
summary and plenary jurisdiction, the bankruptcy judge only had jurisdiction if there was
consent or possession . . . summary referred not to procedure but possession of assets.");
JORDAN & WARNER, BANKRUPTCY 900 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter JORDAN] ("[Summary bankruptcy jurisdiction] extended to matters of administration (claims, distribution, discharge,
etc.), to property in the actual or constructive possession of the debtor at the time of the
petition, and to controversies with respect to which the nonbankrupt litigant had consented, actually or constructively, to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.") (citation
omitted).
4" Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(1984).
" Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2671 (1978), 28 U.S.C. § 1480 (1978). Section 1480,
entitled "Jury trials," provided:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter and title 11 do
not affect any right to trial by jury in a case arising under title 11 or in a proceeding
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11, that is provided
by any statute in effect on September 30, 1979.
(b) The bankruptcy court may order the issues arising under section 303 of title 11
to be tried without a jury.
Id.
"

Id. See supra note 48 (text of 28 U.S.C. § 1480(b)).
See supra note 35 (text of 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988)).

61 Id.
82

See

WEINTRAUB,

supra note 6,

6.06 at 6-30 & n.5 (1986). The authors cite, for exam-
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ruptcy courts, acknowledging their status as courts of equity,
deemed themselves powerless to conduct jury trials.3 Section
pie: Brown v. Frank Meador Buick, Inc. (In re Frank Meador Buick, Inc.), 8 Bankr. 450,
454-55 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981) (plaintiff has right to jury trial in bankruptcy court since he
would have had right to jury trial had issue been raised in State or Federal court); Pereira
v. Checkmate Comm. Co. (In re Checkmate Stereo & Elec., Ltd.), 21 Bankr. 402, 408
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1982) ("[W]here a right to a jury trial existed prior to enactment of the
new code, section 1480 makes clear that it will not otherwise be diminished.").
5' See, e.g., Merrill v. Heller & Co. (In re Merrill), 594 F.2d 1064, 1067 (5th Cir. 1979)
("Because of the equitable nature of bankruptcy proceedings there is generally no constitutional right to a jury trial.").
Moreover, bankruptcy courts have considered their tribunals inherently equitable, and
therefore powerless to conduct jury trials, both before and after the 1984 amendments
which repealed section 1480. See, e.g., Nordberg v. Granfinanciera, S.A. (In re Chase &
Sanborn Corp.), 835 F.2d 1341 (1lth Cir. 1988), affg 58 Bankr. 721 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1986 ), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1990). The Eleventh Circuit noted that "bankruptcy itself is
equitable in nature and thus bankruptcy proceedings are inherently equitable." Nordberg,
835 F.2d at 1349. Relying on its three-part test, the Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Eleventh Circuit and concluded that fraudulent conveyance actions are based upon
legal claims rather than equitable claims. Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2790-94. The
Court's conclusion, however, does not necessarily imply that bankruptcy courts are no
longer "essentially courts of equity." Id. at 2798. In part three of its analysis, the Court
stated: "[w]e must decide whether Congress may assign and has assigned resolution of the
relevant claim to a non-Article III adjudicative body that does not use a jury as a factfinder."
Id. at 2790 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Such a statement suggests that the Court
still recognizes the equitable nature of bankruptcy courts. See also supra note 4 (discussing
Court's inquiry into whether Congress has permissibly entrusted resolution of certain disputes to administrative agency or specialized court of equity). The GranfinancieraCourt acknowledged that Congress did not have the authority to take away parties' seventh amendment right to trial by jury. Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2797. The Court stated: "The
Constitution nowhere grants Congress such puissant authority. '[L]egal claims are not magId. at
ically converted into equitable issues by their presentation to a court of equity .
2795 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
In part three of its analysis, the Court examined the issue of whether Congress may place
causes of action that are analogous to common law claims "beyond the ambit of the Seventh
Amendment by assigning their resolution to a forum in which jury trials are unavailable." Id.
at 2796 (emphasis added in part) (citations omitted). The Court concluded that a legal
cause of action may be tried without a jury if it is public in nature. Id. The public-private
distinction of causes of action originally arose in the case of Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 458 (1977). The Granfinanciera
opinion notes that the Atlas case failed to define "public rights." Id. at 2795 n.4. The term,
however, was previously defined in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), as "the liability
of one individual to another under the law .... Crowell 285 U.S. at 51. "In addition, the
Crowell Court defined 'public rights' as aris[ing] between the Government and persons subject to authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the
executive or legislative departments.' " Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2795 n.4.
Although the public-private distinction is beyond the scope of this Note, the discussion
of this distinction in Granfinanciera is noteworthy since it suggests that the Court has already determined that bankruptcy courts lack the authority to conduct jury trials. This
conclusion is supported by the Court's contention that, since the "respondent's right to
recover a fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(2), is not a "public right" for
article III purposes, then Congress may not assign its adjudication to a specialized non-
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1480(a), however, was soon abrogated in response to the 1982 Supreme Court decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 4
In Northern Pipeline, a plurality of the Court found that the
1978 Reform Act's expansive grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy
courts was unconstitutional in part because bankruptcy judges
were not life-tenured, nor given protection against salary reduction, which are expressly required under article III of the United
States Constitution." In this regard, the Court directed Congress
article III court lacking 'the essential attributes of the judicial power.' " Id. at 2796 (quoting

Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51) (emphasis added). Moreover, in finding that the cause of action in
dispute was private in nature, the GranfinancieraCourt concluded that "Congress cannot
eliminate a party's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial merely by relabeling the cause
of action to which it attaches and placing exclusive jurisdiction in an administrative agency
or a specialized court of equity." Id. at 2800 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

By referring to bankruptcy courts as tribunals that do not use juries as factfinders, or as
specialized courts of equity, the Granfinanciera opinion suggests that the Supreme Court
regards bankruptcy courts as inherently courts of equity. See id. at 2787-90. See also Kroh
Bros. Dev. Co. v. Bazan (In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co.), 91 Bankr. 889, 892 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1988). The Kroh opinion states:
The courts adopting this view [that jury trials are not permitted nor mandated in
core proceedings] believe that Congress intended for the distinction between core
and non-core proceedings under the current bankruptcy code to parallel summary
and plenary jurisdiction of the old bankruptcy act. [Summary jurisdiction is discussed briefly, supra, at note 44.] And, since jury trials were not allowed under the
old act, and the new act was not intended to change the parties' right to a jury trial
in bankruptcy matters, jury trials are not allowed in core proceedings.
Id. (citations omitted). While the Granfinancieradecision casts doubt on the theory that all
core proceedings are equitable, it does not appear to dispute the theory that bankruptcy
courts are specialized courts of equity. Granfinanciera, 109 S.Ct. at 2782, passim. The
Court rejected the notion that Congress perceived all core proceedings as equitable because respondent therein did not provide the Court with "evidence that Congress considered the constitutional implications of its designation of all fraudulent conveyance actions
as core proceedings." Id. at 2800.
Nevertheless, other courts have also deemed bankruptcy tribunals inherently equitable.
See, e.g., Merrill v. W.E. Heller & Co. (In re Merrill), 594 F.2d 1064, 1067 (5th Cir. 1979)
(citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336-40 (1966)); Pro Machine, Inc. v. Harding
Bros., Inc. (In re Pro Machine, Inc.), 87 Bankr. 998, 1002 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) ("Bankruptcy courts are essentially courts of equity.") (citing Katchen, 382 U.S. at 327); Global
Int'l Air. Corp. v. Azima (In re Global Int'l Air. Corp.), 81 Bankr. 541, 543 (W.D. Md.
1988) ("proceedings of bankruptcy courts are inherently proceedings in equity") (quoting
American Universal Ins. Co. v. Pugh, 821 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Katchen, 382
U.S. at 336-37)); Hoffman v. Brown (In re Brown), 56 Bankr. 487, 489 (Bankr. D. Md.
1985) ("case law has held that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity"). For a discussion of
the Supreme Court's decision in Katchen, see supra note 22.
458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 87. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens joined. Id. at 50. The Court quoted article III of the Constitution and asserted
that the "good behaviour" clause assures that article III judges will receive life tenure and
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to revise the Reform Act before a certain date, 5" but Congress
failed to meet that deadline, as well as its subsequent extension.5"
In response to Congress' inaction, the Judicial Conference of the
United States proposed a Model Emergency Rule which was
adopted by all judicial circuits. 58 The relevant jury trial provision
in the Emergency Rule unambiguously prohibited bankruptcy
judges from conducting jury trials." Congress finally responded to
Northern Pipeline when it drafted Title I of the Bankruptcy
may be removed only upon impeachment. Id. at 59. Also, the Court stated that the Compensation Clause guarantees that article III judges receive "fixed and irreducible compensation for their services." Id. at 59 (quoting U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980)).
Bankruptcy judges, however, were not given such article III protections under the 1978
Act. Id. at 60. Consequently, the Court concluded that such a grant of jurisdiction, which
granted "essential attributes" of article III judicial power to a non-article III adjunct, is
unconstitutional. Id. at 87.
Id. at 88. Although the Northern Pipeline case was decided on June 28, 1982, its judgment was to be stayed until October 4, 1982. Id. at 88. "This limited stay will afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of
adjudication without impairing the interim administration of the bankruptcy laws." Id.
" See WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, 1 6.03, at 6-8 ("When Congress failed to remedy the
situation, the stay was extended to December 24, 1982. Nonetheless, Congress failed to act
by the December 24 deadline and the Court denied another request to further extend the
stay."); JORDAN, supra note 47 at 925 ("Congress did not act by the October 4, 1982 deadline set in Northern Pipeline, but the Court extended its stay.").
" JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., REP. OF PRoc. (Sept. 1982). See generally WEINTRAUB, supra note
6, V 6.03 at 6-8 & n.3 (brief discussion of model emergency rule) (citing Countryman,
Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction:The Chief, The JudicialConference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 19-28 (1985) [hereinafter COUNTRYMAN]). Professor Countryman informs:
[T]he Judicial Conference adopt[ed] a resolution requiring the Director or the Administrative Office of United States Courts to 'provide each circuit with a proposed
rule, which was to take effect in the absence of congressional action. The resolution
was intended to permit the bankruptcy system to continue without disruption in reliance on jurisdictional grants remaining in the law as limited by the Northern Pipeline
decision.'
Id. at 19 (quoting JUD. CONF. at 91).
3.01, at
"' Model Emerg. Bankr. R.(d)(1)(D), reprinted in 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
3-15 (15th ed. 1987) [hereinafter COLLIER]. In relevant part, the Model Emergency Rule
provided:
"(d) Powers of Bankruptcy Judges.
(1) The bankruptcy judges may perform... all acts and duties necessary. , . except that
the bankruptcy judges may not conduct: . . . (D) jury trials." Id. at 3-16.
It should also be noted that the Emergency Rule provided that bankruptcy judges would
have jurisdiction over "related proceedings to set aside preferences and fraudulent conveyances." Id. at 3(A), COLLIER, supra, T 3.01, at 3-17. The Collier treatise correctly notes that
"this provision of the Emergency Rule was unconstitutional because it deprived defendants
in these kinds of actions of their seventh amendment right to a jury trial." Id. at n.2 1(a)
(citing Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2802 (1990)).

306

Jury Trials
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.60 The 1984
Amendments enacted section 1411 under title 28,61 as discussed
earlier, and repealed section 1480.' However, some bankruptcy
courts have failed to acknowledge the repeal of section 1480, and
have persisted in their belief in the existence of statutory author-

ity to allow bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials.63
The next provision relevant to jury trials in bankruptcy court is
Bankruptcy Rule 9015,"5 promulgated under the 1984 Amend" Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified at multiple sections of titles eleven
and twenty eight of the United States Code). See generally WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at
6.04, at 6-12 (1984 amendments replaced model emergency rule); COUNTRYMAN, supra
note 59, at 33-42 & n.254 (broader discussion of same).
"1 Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 335 (1984).
42 Id. Section 1480 of title 28 is not present in either the model emergency rule or the
1984 amendments. See supra note 60 for a discussion of this section's repeal.
6 See, e.g., Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2789 n.3. In a footnote, the Court discussed the
current statutory scheme governing the bankruptcy courts and jury trials therein. Id. Section 1480 would not apply to petitioners' claim, however, because their cause of action
arose after September 30, 1979. Id. The Court then stated, "As [petitioners] recognize,
section 1480 was apparently repealed by the 1984 Amendments." Id. (emphasis added). It is
submitted that the Supreme Court should know in more certain terms whether this provision was or was not, in fact, repealed. The Court cited two law review articles, briefly
discussed infra this note, to support its assertion that the section was ambiguously repealed.
Id. These commentators concluded, however, that the section was repealed. See GIBSON,
supra note 31, at 989; KING, supra note 30, at 703 n.79. See also Comment, The Bankruptcy
Amendments and FederalJudgeship Act of 1984: The Impact on the Right ofJury Trial in Bankruptcy Court, 16 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 535, 543 (1985) ("section 1480 was repealed in full.").
In Gibson, supra note 31, at 989, a footnote recognized that the 1984 amendments were
ambiguous because different provisions were apparently contradictory. Id. at 989 n.96.
Professor Gibson asserted that "[most] courts and commentators sensibly conclude, however, that section 1480 was repealed outright or by implication by the 1984 Amendments."
Id. (citing American Univ. Ins. Co. v. Pugh (In re Pugh), 72 Bankr. 174, 177 (Bankr. D. Or.
1986), affg 821 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1987)) ("I note that 28 U.S.C. § 1480 was repealed,
albeit clumsily, by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984....
Section 1480 was replaced by 28 U.S.C. § 1411."). See KING, supra note 31, at 703 n.79
(noting inconsistency between sections of the 1984 amendments, but concluding that "§
1411 rather than § 1480 controls the right to jury trial in proceedings arising in or related
to cases under the Bankruptcy Code."). See also Sabino, supra note 31, at 242. Sabino
states: "the 1984 Amendments repealed Section 1480, admittedly by a most circuitous
route." Id. He notes an opinion by Bankruptcy Judge Steen who concluded from a "painstaking analysis" that section 1480 was, in fact, repealed. Id. at 243 & 235-37; Jacobs v.
O'Bannon (In re O'Bannon), 49 Bankr. 763, 767 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985) (holding that
section 1480 has been "effectively repealed").
" See Fed. Bankr. R. 9015, 11 U.S.C.A. § 9015 (West 1984). This rule provided, for
example: time for a jury demand, R. 9015(b)(1); the procedure by which a party may specify which issues that party desires tried by jury, R. 9015(b)(2); authority for the court to
"determine whether there is a right to trial by jury" or whether a jury demand with respect to issues arising in an involuntary petition shall be granted, on motion by the parties
or on its own initiative, R. 9015(b)(3); that failure to timely demand a trial by jury consti-
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ments. 66 Rule 9015 outlines the procedure to be followed when
litigants make a demand for a trial by jury.66 Although some
bankruptcy courts disagree,67 this Rule has been relied upon by
certain courts as express authority for conducting jury trials. 68
The former courts argue that this procedural rule could not create
the substantive right to a trial by jury in a bankruptcy court,69
relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2075, which prohibits the Rules from "enlarging, abridging, or modifying any substantive rights. ' 7 0 Thus,
these courts insist that Rule 9015 could never have provided
bankruptcy courts with the explicit or implicit authority to hold
jury trials. 7 1 Moreover, it should be noted that Congress repealed
Rule 9015 under the 1987 amendments to the Bankruptcy
tutes waiver, R. 9015(c); that "[i]ssues not demanded for trial by jury shall be tried by the
court," or may at the court's own initiative, be ordered triable by a jury, R. 9015(d). Id.
" See Order Prescribing Bankruptcy Rules, 461 U.S. 975 (1983). Herein, the Supreme
Court "[o]rdered .... That the rules of procedure in bankruptcy cases.... to be known as
the Bankruptcy Rules, be, and the hereby are, prescribed pursuant to Section 2075, Title
28, United States Code, to govern the practice and procedure in cases under Title 11,
United States Code" Id. at 975.
" See supra note 65 (paraphrased text of Bankruptcy Rule 9015).
61 See, e.g., THB Corp., 94 Bankr. at 801 (noting that official comment to abrogation of
Bankruptcy Rule 9015 dictates reason for abrogation was "to prevent the rule from being
relied upon as support for the substantive power of a bankruptcy judge to conduct a jury
") (emphasis added); Kraus-Thompson Pub., Inc. (In re McCorhill Pub.), 90
trial ....
Bankr. 633, 636 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075, the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate Bankruptcy rules is limited by the restriction that such rules
'shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.' The Bankruptcy Rules may not
create substantive rights, such as the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.") (emphasis
supplied by quoting court). See also Sabino, supra note 27, at 239-42 (Advisory Committee
abrogated Rule 9015 in light of restrictive boundaries of 28 U.S.C. § 2075).
" In Re Mark Jay Kaufman, P.A., 78 Bankr. 309, 311 (N.D. Fla. 1987) ("Rule 9015 has
been cited as conferring a right to jury trial"). See supra note 37 (full text of Committee
Note). See, e.g., Dailey v. First Peoples Bank, 76 Bankr. 963, 967 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1987)
("We suggest that acting with Rule 9015 in the background, Congress would have made
explicit its desire to abrogate the authority to hear jury cases had it intended to do so.");
Lombard-Wall Inc. v. New York Housing Dev. Corp. (In re Lombard-Wall Inc.), 48 Bankr.
986, 992 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[R]ule 9015 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,....
permits the bankruptcy courts to hold jury trials.") (emphasis added); THB Corp. 94 Bankr. at
801 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (many courts have relied on Rule 9015 as a grant of authority
to conduct jury trials) (citations omitted).
* See KING, supra note 31, at 706 & n.88 (citing relevant caselaw).
'o See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1982). This section, entitled, "Bankruptcy Rules," provides in
pertinent part: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules,
the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions and the practice and procedure in cases
under Title 11. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." Id.
1 See KING, supra note 31, at 706 n.88 ("[I]f Rule 9015 established the substantive right
of jury trial, it would be an invalid exercise of the rulemaking power granted to the Supreme Court by Congress .... ").
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Code. " In the Advisory Committee Note which replaced the
Rule, it was stated that because Rule 9015 "has been cited as conferring a right to jury trial," - an interpretation that is clearly contrary to the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 2075 - the Rule is
abrogated. 3
Consequently, bankruptcy courts are left only with section 1411
to rely upon as authority to conduct jury trials, which, as argued
herein, cannot seriously be interpreted as conferring express statutory authority.
C. Implicit Authority
On February 7, 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania.7 " In
Cooper, it was recognized that there is no express statutory authority for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials.7 5 Nevertheless,
the Cooper court concluded that bankruptcy courts have implied
authority to conduct jury trials in core proceedings.
The Cooper court found implicit statutory authority through a
combination of sections 1517 and 157(b) 78 of title 28, coupled
with the Supreme Court's Granfinancieradecision.7 9 The opinion
quoted section 15 l's authorization that bankruptcy judges be permitted to exercise the authority conferred under chapter six 80
(sections 151 through 158) of title 28. The court then cited section 157(b), which authorizes bankruptcy judges to "hear and determine" core proceedings.8 1 The court noted that Granfinanciera
mandated that when the core proceedings are legal, the seventh
"* See Committee Note, supra note 37 ("Rule 9015 is abrogated.").

See id.
896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269 (1990).
7" Id. at 1402.
76 Id.
77 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
7- 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1988). See supra note 27 (discussion of section 157's "core
proceedings").
79 Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 896 F.2d 1394, 1402 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 3269 (1990).
" Id. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-58 (1988). This chapter provides for the designation of bankruptcy courts, the appointment of bankruptcy judges and their salaries, the division of their
business, their temporary transfer, their staff and expenses, certain procedures and appeals.
Id.
81 Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1988).
71
7'
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amendment requires trial by jury,8"and therefore held that bankruptcy courts are empowered to hear the core proceedings with
the authority to enter judgments.8 3
It is suggested that the Cooper court's analysis of the statutory
scheme supports the contention that bankruptcy courts are impliedly permitted to conduct jury trials. It should be observed,
however, that such an interpretation is unlikely to be uniformly
accepted throughout the circuits. Given the unfairness to litigants
who must rely on a particular court's subjective interpretation of
the present Bankruptcy Code, it is further suggested that the
Code should provide expressly for the right to a jury trial, or
should mandate that all issues triable by jury be referred to the
district court.
III.

CONSTITUTIONALITY

In Granfinanciera,part one of Justice Brennan's three part analysis inquired: If Congress has authorized article I bankruptcy
courts to conduct-jury trials, does such grant of authority comport
with article III?84 It is submitted that Congress may and should
constitutionally empower article I bankruptcy courts with the authority to conduct jury trials in core proceedings under section
157. An analysis of two Supreme Court decisions, and various
lower court interpretations thereof, supports this conclusion.
In the seminal case of Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co, 85 the central issue addressed was "whether the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197886 violates the command of Arti" Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402.
" Id.
" Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2796 (1990). The Granfinanciera
Court did not decide if such authorization comports with article III when non-article III
judges preside over "core proceedings" subject to review in or withdrawal by the district
courts. Id. at 2794-95.
458 U.S. 50 (1982).

See Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 eliminated the referee system and created a system whereby
"in each judicial district, as an adjunct to the district court for such district, a bankruptcy
court which shall be a court of record known as the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District." Bankruptcy Reform Act, ch. 6, 92 Stat. 2549, 2657 (1978) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)). The bankruptcy judges are appointed to office for
fourteen year terms. 28 U.S.C. §§ 152(a)(1), 153(a) (1988). The judges are subject to removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (1988). The salaries are set by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 153(a)
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cle 11187 that the judicial power of the United States must be
vested in courts whose judges enjoy the protections and safe' Since the 1978 Bankruptcy Reguards specified in that Article." 88
form Act conferred broad, article III-like power to the bankruptcy courts, while these courts retained their non-article III
status, the Northern Pipeline Court declared this Act

unconstitutional

89

(1988), and are subject to adjustment under the Federal Salary Act. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 351361 (1988).
The Act also eliminated the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction by
giving the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under title 11 .See 28 U.S.C. § 147 1(b) (1988). The Court in Northern Pipeline stated, "[t]his jurisdictional
grant empowers bankruptcy courts to entertain a wide variety of cases involving claims that
may affect the property of the estate once a petition has been filed under Title 11 ." Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 54.
The Northern Pipeline Court also noted that the Act conferred upon bankruptcy courts
all the "powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty ... ."Id. at 55. In addition, the
Court listed some other powers given to the bankruptcy courts, including the power to
hold jury trials (section 1480); the power to issue declaratory judgments (section 2201); the
power to issue writs of habeus corpus (section 2256). See id. at 55.
67 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1. Article III, section 1 of the United States Constitution
provides:
The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Id.
The Framers of the Constitution, in an attempt to protect against tyranny, provided that
the federal government would consist of three distinct branches: legislative, executive, and
judicial. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 57. "To be sure the content of the three authorities of government is not to be derived from an abstract analysis, [t]he areas are partly
interacting, not wholly disjointed." Id. at 83 n.35 (citing Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (concurring opinion)). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 122 (1976) ("The framers regarded the checks and balances that they had built into the
tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other."). See generally Note, Article III
Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrate
Act, 80 COLUM. L. REv.560, 583-85 (1980) (tenure and salary provisions of article III serve
as check on judicial power).
See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 62.
n See id. at 87. Specifically, the Court believed that the lack of life tenure and protection
against salary reduction was indicative of the intent of Congress not to make the Bankruptcy Courts into article III tribunals. Id. at 60-61. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
argued that the Framers of the Constitution expressly decided that those courts that have
broad judicial authority must have article III status in order to ensure separation of powers. Id. at 83-87. The Court first dealt with the issue of whether Congress could give bankruptcy courts "legislative court" status and decided that there were three limited situations
where this is allowed: (a) limited geographic areas, (b) court martials, and (c) cases involving
"public rights." Id. at 64-70. The Court held that bankruptcy courts do not fit into any of
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The Court in Northern Pipeline, while abrogating the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, failed to address the specific issue of
90
whether bankruptcy courts are authorized to conduct jury trials.
Bankruptcy courts anticipated an answer to this question when the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to the petitioners in
Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberg.91 However, in Granfinanciera,the
Court found such a determination unnecessary,92 thus depriving
bankruptcy courts of the guidance for which they had eagerly
93
awaited.
these situations. Id. at 71.
" See id. It should be noted that the Northern Pipeline Court discussed four instances
where bankruptcy court jurisdiction under the 1978 Act is different from that exercised by
Administrative Agencies under Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), where the grant of
power was deemed constitutional. Northern Pipelines 458 U.S. at 85. The power to preside
over jury trials was listed by the Court as one of the differences. Id.
Some authorities have used this language to support their view that Northern Pipeline
dictated that jury trials in bankruptcy courts would be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Terry v.
Proehl (In re Proehl), 36 Bankr. 86, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984) (asserting that it would be
unconstitutional to conduct jury trial); Eisenberg v. Guardian Group, Inc. (In re Adams,
Browning, and Bates, Ltd.), 70 Bankr. 490, 496 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (dictating that
Northern Pipeline held that it would be unconstitutional to conduct jury trial). See also infra
note 94 and accompanying text (discussing rationale of those courts deeming jury trials
article III function). But cf. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85 (Court's analogy did not discuss jury trials alone, but listed jury trials among four factors that distinguish constitutional
from unconstitutional grants of jurisdiction).
91
See, e.g., Garrett Rd. Supermarket, Inc. v. Wetterau Fin. Co. (In re Garrett Road
Supermarket, Inc.), 95 Bankr. 904, 905 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
In Granfinanciera, the Supreme Court will review the Ninth Circuit's conclusions
that an action to avoid a fraudulent transfer is, as a core proceeding, inherently
equitable in nature, and that a request solely for monetary relief does not transform
the action into a legal matter entitling parties to a jury trial.
Id. See also Jackson v. Wessel (In re Jackson), 90 Bankr. 126, 135 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
The Jackson court suggested:
We do have some reservations as to our conclusion that, even in this matter, involving a core proceeding which presents an action at law, we, as a bankruptcy court,
may conduct a jury trial. It is hoped that the Supreme Court, having granted certiorari in the Chase and Sanborn, will provide guidance to us in this area, at least in its
next term.
Id.
92 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2802 (1989). The Court stated:
We do not decide today whether the current jury trial provision -28 U.S.C. § 1411
[(Supp. IV 1982)] - permits bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials in fraudulent
conveyance actions like the one respondent initiated. Nor do we express any view as
to whether the Seventh Amendment or Article III allows jury trials in such actions
to be held before non-Article III bankruptcy judges subject to the oversight provided by the District Courts pursuant to the 1984 Amendments.
Id. at 2802.
"' See supra note 91 (cases expressing anticipation of Granfinancieraruling). The Supreme Court has, once again, granted certiorari in a case which gives the Court the oppor-
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Although some courts construe Northern Pipeline as implicitly
holding that bankruptcy courts are not constitutionally permitted
to conduct jury trials,9" it is submitted that such a construction is
incorrect. Upon examination of the Northern Pipeline decision, it is
apparent that the Court there was primarily concerned with the
general grant of jurisdiction contained in 28 U.S.C. section
1471(c), which authorizes bankruptcy courts to adjudicate "essentially state-based claims"." Subsequent case law has suggested that
the power to conduct jury trials was merely one of several factors
considered by the Supreme Court in holding the 1978 legislation
unconstitutional.9 6
tunity to resolve the issue. See Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 896 F.2d 1394 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269 (1990).
" See, e.g., 70 Bankr. 490, 496 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("But for [Northern Pipeline]
there would be no question but that the bankruptcy court has the necessary statutory authority to conduct jury trials"). 50 Bankr. 175, 181 (Bankr. D. N. Dak. 1985) (jury trials
must be given in cases at law but cannot be heard by bankruptcy judge if jury trial is
requested); Eisenberg v. Guardian Group, Inc. (In re Adams, Browning and Bates Ltd.),
Hoffman v. Brown (In re Brown), 56 Bankr. 487, 488 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985) (U.S. bankruptcy courts have no authority to conduct jury trials); Cameron v. Anderson (In re American Energy, Inc.), Terry v. Proehi (In re Proehl), 36 Bankr. 86, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984)
("Implicit in the Northern Pipeline decision is the conclusion that it would be an unconstitutional delegation to permit a bankruptcy judge to preside over a jury trial."). See generally,
Sabino, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy Court: A Continuing Controversy, 90 COMM. L.J. 342, 344-45
(1985) [hereinafter Sabino, Bankruptcy, Continuing Controversy] (general discussion of Northern Pipeline and parameters it established).
96 See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84 (1982). The Court's primary concern was that
non-article III bankruptcy judges were exercising the full range of article III powers while
adjudicating traditional state common law actions. Id. See also Gibson, supra note 31, at
1038-39. Professor Gibson argued that the Court in Northern Pipeline did not suggest that
article III would always be violated if bankruptcy judges conducted jury trials. Id. In support of this contention, Professor Gibson analogized bankruptcy courts with other nonarticle III judges who conduct jury trials, such as the District of Columbia judges and
United States Magistrates. Id. See also Walsh v. Long Beach Honda (In re Gaildeen Indus.),
59 Bankr. 402, 406-07 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1986) ("Allowing bankruptcy courts to conduct
jury trials - at least in 'core' matters like this one - is not inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in Marathon."); Hassett v. Weisman (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 48
Bankr. 824, 828-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (construing Northern Pipeline as holding that Congress
could not grant bankruptcy courts with power to hear case involving state law claim extraneous to bankruptcy action); Lerblance v. Rodgers (In re Rodgers and Sons), 48 Bankr.
683, 685 (Bankr. E.D. Oki. 1985) (perceiving Northern Pipeline as including authority to
conduct jury trials "in a long laundry list of Article III powers"); Nashville City Banks
Trust Co. v. Armstrong (In re River Trans. Co.), 35 Bankr. 556, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1983) (permitting bankruptcy court to preside over jury trials does not offend the principles set forth in Northern Pipeline).
"See Walsh, 59 Bankr. at 406. The Walsh court held that bankruptcy courts could conduct jury trials in core proceedings because Northern Pipeline's principal concern was an
overbroad grant of jurisdiction which allowed bankruptcy courts to adjudicate state-based
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Moreover, not all non-article III tribunals have been constitutionally prohibited from conducting jury trials."7 As such, a majorclaims. Id. The court, after noting that the Supreme Court adopted Rule 9015 more than a
year after its decision in Northern Pipeline, reasoned that "had the Court meant to preclude
bankruptcy judges from conducting jury trials, it would not have adopted the Rule." Id. at
407. "The thrust of the holding in [Northern Pipeline] is that peripheral, non-traditional
bankruptcy issues cannot be tried by a non-Article III judge." Lerblance, 48 Bankr. at 687.
See also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985) ("The
Court's holding in [Northern Pipeline] establishes only that Congress may not vest in a nonArticle III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders
in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and
subject only to ordinary appellate review.").
But see McCormick v. American Investors Management, Inc. (In re McCormick), 67
Bankr. 838, 839 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) ("One of the 'essential attributes' of the judicial
power mentioned by Justice Brennan was the power of the bankruptcy courts to conduct
jury trials."); Sabino, Bankruptcy, Continuing Controversy, supra note 95, at 345 ("Equally
important are the parameters established by [Northern Pipeline] in outlining what powers
are permissibly exercised by Article III courts alone. Justice Brennan's opinion specifies the
power to preside over jury trials as one of the 'essential attributes of the judicial power'
reserved to the Article III courts.").
" See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 passim (1974). See also Gibson, supra note
32, at 1039. Non-article III tribunals, including United States magistrates and Courts established by Congress in the District of Columbia, have been constitutionally empowered
to conduct jury trials. Id. The authority for magistrates to conduct jury trials has been
upheld by several courts of appeals. See, e.g., Fields v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (validity of Magistrates Act upheld due to requirement of consent by parties and accountability of magistrates to article III judiciary);
Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984). The
Goldstein court stated:
Magistrates - unlike the bankruptcy judges whose expanded jurisdiction was struck
down in Northern Pipeline.. . - are appointed and removed by Article III judges ....
Magistrates are thus in large measure shielded from coercion by the executive or
legislative branches and from improper societal influences by the Article III salary
and tenure safeguards pertaining to the judges under whose control they serve.
Id.
Several courts utilized the United States Magistrates' system as a prime example of a
non-article III tribunal that is empowered to conduct jury trials. See, e.g., M&E Contractors,
Inc. v. Kugler-Morris Gen. Contractors, Inc. (In re Kugler-Morris), 67 Bankr. 260, 266
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986). In M&E Contractors, the court cites United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667, 682 (1980), as affirming the use of an adjunct magistrate system, in which a jury
trial is only granted upon consent of the parties. Id. However, the court dictated that this
consent element was an irrelevant distinction, because "[i]f, in fact, the power to hold a
jury trial were exclusively an Article III function, private parties would not be able to
unilaterally vest a court with Article III powers it is incapable of receiving." Id. at n.8. See
also Weeks v. Kramer (In re G. Weeks Sec., Inc.), 89 Bankr. 697, 714 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1988) ("[Sltatutory authority for consensual jury trials before a magistrate is significant to
the extent that it evidences Congressional ability to authorize non-Article III courts to
conduct jury trials."); Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v. United Mo. Bank of Kan. City (In re Kroh
Bros. Dev. Co.), 108 Bankr. 710, 714 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) (article I judges cannot
conduct jury trials except by statute, like that for federal magistrates).
The use of analogies has been criticized due to the differences between the statutes involved. See Gibson, iupra note 31, at 1039-40. Professor Gibson noted that Northern Pipe-
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ity of courts have concluded that there is nothing inherently unconstitutional in allowing a non-article III court to conduct jury
trials. 98
The greatest impediment, therefore, to bankruptcy courts conducting jury trials lies not with the Northern Pipeline decision
alone, but with the Northern Pipeline limits coupled with a lack of
express statutory authority. 99
Although the Supreme Court in Granfinanciera declined to address this issue, it did recognize constitutional restraints under
Northern Pipeline.' 'In doing so, the Court revealed its intention
to revitalize the article III concerns conveyed by the Northern
Pipeline Court.'
Several lower courts have correctly perceived
line illustrated the difference between the statutory authority given bankruptcy judges and
that given federal magistrates. Id. For example, Magistrates can enter final judgments only
where there is consent of the parties, whereas bankruptcy judges can enter final judgments
in core proceedings under section 157(b) without consent of the parties. Id. at 1040 n.342.
Therefore, Gibson contended that the article III issue as it relates to bankruptcy must be
addressed without reference to analogous grants of power. Id. at 1040. See also Sabino,
Bankruptcy, Continuing Controversy, supra note 95, at 345. Sabino discredited the analogies
not only to magistrates, but to District of Columbia courts and special masters as well. Id.
As for District of Columbia courts, Sabino claims this analogy ignores Northern Pipeline's
finding that District Courts are uniquely empowered due to their status. Id. Sabino also
refutes the analogy to special masters, noting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b)
dictates that "a reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule." Id.
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (setting forth caselaw permitting bankruptcy courts to grant jury trials).
" See Weeks, 89 Bankr. at 714 ("The absence of that positive expression and the presence of statutory language to the contrary, coupled with the (Northern Pipeline] limits
placed on this Court's authority makes it clear . . .that Congress did not authorize jury
trials in the bankruptcy courts."); Hughes-Bechtol, Inc. v. Air Enters. Inc. (In re HughesBechtol, Inc.), 107 Bankr. 552, 569 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989). Based on repeated statements
by the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline and Granfinancieraconveying article III concerns, Bankruptcy Judge Waldron concluded that for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury
trials, there must be express statutory authority. Id. After an examination of the statutory
scheme, the court determined that the 1984 amendments contained no such authorization.
Id. at 569-70.
100 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, .109 S. Ct. 2782, 2796-2801 (1989). "[W]e therefore rely . . . on our decisions exploring the restrictions Article III places on Congress'
choice of adjudicative bodies to resolve disputes over statutory rights to determine whether
petitioners are entitled to a jury trial." Id. at 2796. "Nor do we express any view as to
whether the Seventh Amendment or Article III allows jury trials in such actions to be held
before non-Article III bankruptcy judges subject to the oversight provided by the district
courts pursuant to the 1984 Amendments." Id. at 2802.
101 See Hughes-Bechtol, 107 Bankr. at 567. In recognizing the constitutional significance of
this issue, Judge Waldron reasoned:
This court believes that a fair reading of Granfinancierareflects a consistent concern
by the Supreme Court that the separation of powers doctrine reflected in the independence of the Federal Judiciary pursuant to Article III of the Constitution re-
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this progression as necessitating that express statutory authority
exist in order to conduct jury trials.102
IV.

PROPOSALS

It is contended that Congress has the authority to grant bankruptcy courts the power to conduct jury trials, and that the intent
of the 1978 legislation was to do just that. The 1978 Act was not
declared unconstitutional solely because of its jury trial provision. 103 In fact, it is asserted that a statute conferring such power
to bankruptcy courts would withstand constitutional attack. The
authors propose that such a statute is necessary to solve the jurisdictional dilemma with which bankruptcy courts are presently
faced.
There is, however, an alternative: Congress has the power to
quires the Supreme Court to exercise continual vigilance to prevent encroachment
by other branches of the government. It is also clear that the Supreme Court has
determined that Congress has limited power to provide authority for non-Article III
courts to adjudicate issues requiring a jury trial.
Id. Bankruptcy Judge Waldron then analyzed the statutory scheme, keeping in mind the
limits placed by the Supreme Court language in Northern Pipeline and Granfinanciera.Id. Cf
Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F. 2d 1394 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3269 (1990). Circuit Judge Timbers argued "that Granfinanciera
does not foreclose the possibility of jury trials in the bankruptcy court." Id. Judge Timbers
quoted GranfinancieraCourt language to support this view:
[O]ne cannot easily say that 'the jury would be incompatible' with bankruptcy proceedings, in view of Congress' express provision for jury trials in certain actions arising out of bankruptcy litigation. And Justice White's claim that juries may serve
usefully as checks only on the decisions of judges who enjoy life tenure overlooks the
extent to which judges who are appointed for fixed terms may be beholden to Congress or executive officials, and thus ignores the potential for juries to exercise beneficial restraint on their decisions.
Id. (quoting Granfinanciera,109 S. Ct. at 2801). Judge Timbers concluded that, despite the
lack of a specific statutory provision, bankruptcy courts may conduct jury trials in core
proceedings. Id. at 1403-04.
10' See, e.g., Hughes-Bechtol, 107 Bankr. at 571-572. In Hughes-Bechtol, Bankruptcy Judge
Waldron analyzed the statutory scheme only after he established Supreme Court concerns
surrounding article III. Id. In this examination, Bankruptcy Judge Waldron discerned that
in the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code (following Northern Pipeline), Congress
did not expressly state whether bankruptcy courts are authorized to conduct jury trials. Id.
at 569-70. See also Haden v. Edwards (In re Edwards), 104 Bankr. 890, 899 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1989) (no statute on point, therefore bankruptcy court not empowered to conduct
jury trials in either core or non-core proceedings). But see Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402 ("Despite the lack of a specific statutory provision, we nevertheless hold that the bankruptcy
courts may conduct jury trials in core proceedings.").
'" See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussion of Northern Pipeline and its
aftermath).
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make bankruptcy courts article III tribunals.'" At least one authority has suggested that this approach was not taken in 1984
because of the contempt conveyed by the judiciary toward granting life tenure to bankruptcy judges.10 5 By granting article III status to bankruptcy courts, Congress would achieve what appears to
have been its objective under the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act:
permitting all bankruptcy proceedings to take place at one time in
one tribunal.
Due to the present confusion stemming from this recurring and
difficult issue, any path chosen by Congress will be beneficial to
litigants, who are presently afforded no explicit guidance. The decision in Granfinanciera has opened the door to an influx of jury
demands in bankruptcy proceedings. It is incumbent upon Congress to decide whether to authorize bankruptcy courts to open
their doors to these demands.
V.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The foregoing discussion argues that Congress should provide
bankruptcy courts with the statutory authority to conduct jury triSee WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, 6.03, at 6-8. The authors stated:
Although other alternatives might be conceived, in essence Congress had the choice
of either creating a new Article III bankruptcy court complete with life tenure and
protections against salary reduction, or establishing a non-Article III bankruptcy
court with limited jurisdiction similar to that of the bankruptcy judges under the
former Bankruptcy Act.
Id. See also King, supra note 30, at 676 ("The 1984 amendments could have eliminated the
constitutional defects of the 1978 Act by converting the bankruptcy courts to article III
courts."); Gibson, supra note 31, at 1054 ("Congress should reconstitute the bankruptcy
courts as article III courts with full powers to conduct jury trials in all types of bankruptcy
proceedings.").
108 See King, supra note 30, at 676. King criticized, "But faced with the well-organized
opposition of the rest of the federal judiciary, which adamantly had refused to accept life
tenure for bankruptcy judges since it was first proposed in 1977, Congress did not adopt
this simple solution to the jurisdiction problem." Id. (footnotes omitted). The decision
aided only one group, the district court bench, "by keeping their numbers small... and
their status elite." Id. at 710. King further criticized that the congressional action leaves
debtors in Bankruptcy Code cases uncertain as to the jurisdiction over their claims, and
facilitates new layers of potential litigation tactics which burden both the district courts and
the bankruptcy courts. Id. See also Gibson, supra note 31, at 1054. Gibson argued that
Congress made a wise decision in 1978 to consolidate all bankruptcy-related matters in the
bankruptcy court. Id. She criticized Congress for "undercut[ting] that policy by retaining a
clumsy and inefficient court structure that requires some matters to be tried in the district
court and forces the bankruptcy proceeding into abeyance while awaiting the district
court's decision." Id.
104
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als. Pursuant to Granfinanciera, the jury trial demand will be
granted in the limited circumstance where: (1) the proceeding is
core, (2) the cause of action is legal, and (3) the party demanding
trial by jury has not submitted a proof of claim against the bankrupt estate.1 "6 This Note contends that bankruptcy courts should
be uniformly empowered (or, in a less-desired alternative, uniformly denied the power) to conduct jury trials in such
circumstances. 10
It is conceded that practical limitations may prohibit bankruptcy
courts from properly conducting jury trials. 08 Indeed, some bankruptcy courts which have acknowledged both a litigant's right to
trial by jury and the bankruptcy court's power to conduct it have
nevertheless been forced to request withdrawal." 9 For this reason,
100 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, passim (1989).
107 See Perino v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 107 Bankr. 453, 455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1989)
("The Bankruptcy Court may and should conduct the jury trial because judicial efficiency
and fairness to both parties will be served if the entire controversy . . .is adjudicated by
one judicial officer in one proceeding."). Cf. Data Compass Corp. v. Datafast, Inc. (In re
Data Compass Corp.), 92 Bankr. 575, 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) (after deciding referral
was required, Bankruptcy Judge Hall stated, "we [do not] wish that our conclusion in the
instant case operates to inhibit the ability of our fellow judicial brethren in this Court to
undertake the conducting of jury trials should they find it possible to surmount the practical obstacles.").
108 See Stewart v. Strasburger (In re Astrocade, Inc.), 79 Bankr. 983, 991 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1987) ("bankruptcy courts... not physically equipped nor staffed to accomodate jury
trials"); Weeks v. Kramer (In re G. Weeks Sec., Inc.) 89 Bankr. 697, 710 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1988) ("To permit the conducting of jury trials in the bankruptcy court on an occasional basis may breed trial error through judicial inexperience."); Data Compass, 92 Bankr.
at 583 ("We too are concerned about the inadequate ability of this Court to efficiently
administer a jury trial when such trials are conducted on a sporadic basis, due to a lack of
appropriate accommodations, staffing and procedures to address the requirements of conducting a jury trial here."). See also Wilkey v. Inter-Trade, Inc. (In re Owensboro Distilling
Co.), 108 Bankr. 572, 576-77 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1989) (listing various limitations, including:
court dockets and space will not accommodate jury trials, court is not physically equipped,
court does not have sufficient expertise, and occasional jury trials may breed trial error
through judicial inexperience); Zimmerman v. Cavanagh (In re Kenval Mktg. Corp.), 65
Bankr. 548, 555 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) ("As a practical matter, however, the bankruptcy
court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, at the present time, is somewhat limited in
terms of space, staff, and judicial personnel.").
108 See, e.g., Kenval Mktg., 65 Bankr. at 555-56 (court removed adversary proceeding in
question to district court for jury trial); Data Compass, 92 Bankr. at 584 ("As was the difficulty in Kenval, this court is not equipped or adequately staffed to conduct a jury trial.");
Cameron v. Anderson (In re American Energy, Inc.), 50 Bankr. 175, 181 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1985) ("If a jury trial has been requested and the case is one sufficiently 'related' to the
bankruptcy proceeding to remain in federal court, then the case should be heard by the
federal district judge in the first instance."); Cf.Hoffman v. Brown (In re Brown), 56 Bankr.
487, 491 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985) ("Likewise, considerations of fairness, judicial economy and
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while it is submitted that Congress should expressly authorize
bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials, those courts should also
retain their present ability to request withdrawal where circumstances so require. Such circumstances would permit bankruptcy
judges to consider whether their court's are adequately staffed,
whether the proceeding is truly related to bankruptcy law, and
whether it would otherwise be unfair to the party moving for a
trial by jury to have it conducted by the bankruptcy court."' 0 By
granting bankruptcy judges the power to seek withdrawal when
necessary, a speedy, just and equitable method of adjudicating
bankruptcy proceedings shall be preserved.
Anthony G. Bianchi & Stacey Fitzmaurice

the prevention of needless expense dictate that the instant controversy not be transferred
to the U.S. District Court.").
10 See supra notes 107-08 (discussing various practical limitations faced by bankruptcy
courts concerning their conducting jury trials).
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